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SYMMETRY AND (NETWORK) NEUTRALITY
Tejas N. Narechania*
Review of Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the
Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV.
455 (2020).
INTRODUCTION
In Symmetry’s Mandate, Daniel Walters constructs a compelling account
of a difference between theory and practice in administrative law. 1 In recent
years, several scholars have criticized doctrines, such as Chevron, granting
agencies substantial power to make regulatory policy or adjudicate regulatory claims—seemingly, in their view, at the expense of Congress and the judiciary. 2 And these scholars have found an audience in the courts, with some
notable jurists issuing opinions echoing these critiques. 3 But Symmetry’s
Mandate finds something that may have been lost in the transition from
scholarship to doctrine. While many scholars’ arguments against administrative governance sound in separation-of-powers concerns—concerns that
would seem to apply across both “regulatory” and “deregulatory” agency action—the doctrinal implementation of these ideas has demonstrated serious
concern for possible agency overregulation while evincing little regard for
possible agency underregulation. 4 In Walters’s terms, these cases seem to
tolerate a range of Type II errors (deregulatory errors, or errors in which
agencies “fail[] to operationalize statutes”) while remaking administrative
law doctrine to address Type I errors (regulatory errors, or errors in which

* Robert and Nanci Corson Assistant Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law. I owe many thanks to Jon Gould, Khushali Narechania, and Daniel
Walters for thoughtful comments and suggestions on this project. For excellent research assistance, I thank Ziyad Alghamdi and Delia Scoville. I also thank Mollie Krent and the members
of the Michigan Law Review for their helpful suggestions and careful edits.
1. Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455 (2020).
2. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); see generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (2017) (describing such scholarship).
3. See, e.g., Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–95 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
4. Walters does, to be sure, criticize both courts and scholars, finding that the scholarly
literature contains a “telling silence” regarding deregulatory errors that suggests an “operational[] bias[] toward remedying only one kind of error in the implementation of statutes.” Walters, supra note 1, at 486.
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agencies take action beyond the statute’s intended scope). 5 And he concludes
that such asymmetry both undermines administrative law’s coherence and
injects political and partisan considerations into the judicial review of agency
action. 6
In this short Essay, I take the opportunity to highlight one further potential asymmetry that may yet emerge from the Supreme Court’s application of Chevron’s many doctrines. Drawing on then-Judge Kavanaugh’s disdissental from the D.C. Circuit’s decision affirming network neutrality rules,
I suggest that there is at least one vote on the Supreme Court—and perhaps
more—for an asymmetric approach to the major questions doctrine. 7 Moreover, I demonstrate how asymmetry in this context is deeply irrational. As
applied to network neutrality, the asymmetry has at least one of two effects.
One, it might simply favor one large industry over another, subjecting one
inter-sector wealth transfer to heightened scrutiny, while treating an analogous wealth transfer—in the opposite direction—deferentially. But the judiciary is not typically in the business of favoring one industrial sector over
another. 8 Two, it subjects consumer-protection devices to increased regulatory scrutiny, thereby shifting the costs and burdens of overcoming a regulatory default to those entities—consumers—who can likely least afford to bear
them. Hence, in more general terms, Justice Kavanaugh’s unbalanced approach to the major questions doctrine tends to undermine many of the values—accountability and expertise, among others—that agency policymaking
has long served. 9
I.

ASYMMETRY AND THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
A. Asymmetry and Chevron

In Symmetry’s Mandate, Daniel Walters identifies an asymmetry in the
development of a range of administrative law doctrines—scrutiny for agency
nonenforcement (vis-à-vis judicial review of enforcement actions), or for orders denying petitions for rulemaking (vis-à-vis judicial review of agency

5. Id. at 484.
6. Id. at 516.
7. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), 855 F.3d 381, 417–26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Justice Kavanaugh’s express endorsement of an asymmetric approach to the major questions doctrine seems to have been
largely overlooked in the still-growing literature regarding that doctrine. One notable exception includes Daniel Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law,” YALE J.
ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judgekavanaugh-and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-daniel-deacon/
[https://perma.cc/8GJJLCPF]
8. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2120 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“[O]ne
overarching goal is to make judging a neutral, impartial process in all cases . . . .”).
9. See Mila Sohoni, King’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1437–39 (2018).
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rulemaking)—that seems to disfavor regulation for deregulation (and nonregulation) and thereby destabilizes administrative law’s coherence and continuity (and perhaps legitimacy) across presidential administrations. Among
Walters’s examples is Chevron. 10 Chevron, of course, is a multipartite doctrine, and one typical hornbook account of Chevron follows three steps,
numbered zero through two. 11 First, at Step Zero, a reviewing court considers whether Congress has granted the agency the authority to administer a
statutory program by issuing decisions carrying the force of law. 12 If so, then
the court moves on to consider Chevron’s Steps One and Two:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 13

Walters focuses specifically on Chevron’s Step Two (requiring courts to assess the reasonableness of an agency’s construction and to defer to any reasonable agency construction), finding that “critics of Chevron seem skeptical
that it applies with as much force when agencies commit [a potential] Type
II error” through underregulation but seem less skeptical in cases presenting
the possibility of Type I error through overregulation. 14
As an example, Walters emphasizes Justice Thomas’s recent reconsideration of his majority opinion in Brand X as proof of this asymmetry in practice. 15 In Brand X, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Communications
Commission’s decision to treat cable modem service—the broadband internet access service sold by cable companies—as beyond its regulatory powers. 16 But as the Commission has more recently exercised the flexibility
accorded to it by Chevron to reregulate (and re-deregulate) broadband car-

10. Walters, supra note 1, at 495–96.
11. See Tejas N. Narechania, Defective Patent Deference, 95 WASH. L. REV. 869, 880
(2020). But see Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 757, 759–60 (2017) (collecting descriptions of Chevron that range from one step to
four).
12. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001); see also Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873–89 (2001); Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
14. See Walters, supra note 1, at 495.
15. Id.
16. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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riage by, say, imposing (and then later rescinding) network neutrality rules, 17
Justice Thomas has—consistent with his more recent criticisms of Chevron—
signaled some willingness to revisit his own majority opinion in Brand X. 18
In Walters’s view, this inconsistency seems outcome-driven: He suggests that
“one might . . . reasonably question whether Justice Thomas’s new thinking
about the limits of interpretive maneuvers by agencies will extend to cases,”
like the Commission’s decision to re-deregulate broadband carriers, “that
introduce [the possibility for] Type II error.” 19
I agree that Justice Thomas has signaled a deep skepticism of Chevron
and Brand X, and that his skepticism may well be more likely to manifest in
a decision addressing a putative Type I error. 20 For now, however, I aim to
shift focus to a different aspect of Chevron and to a different member of the
Court—namely, to Step Zero and to Justice Kavanaugh.
B. Asymmetry and the Major Questions Doctrine
As noted, I focus here on Chevron’s Step Zero and, in particular, the major questions doctrine. 21 While there is some dispute over the doctrine’s precise contours, its basic premise is simple: Some matters are so important—so
major—that Congress would not have delegated policymaking authority to
an agency over such matters without saying so explicitly. In MCI v. AT&T,
one of the earliest examples of the doctrine, the Court concluded that the
Commission’s power to “modify” rate regulations did not encompass the
power to eliminate them entirely, reasoning that it was “highly unlikely” that
Congress would delegate to an agency the power to decide whether an entire
industry should or should not be subject to rate regulation. 22 More recently,
17. See, respectively, U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
and Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
18. Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–91 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Although I authored Brand X, ‘it is never too late to “surrende[r] former views to a better considered position” ’ . . . . My skepticism of Brand X begins
at its foundation—Chevron deference.” (first alteration in original) (quoting South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
19. Walters, supra note 1, at 495.
20. But cf. Lipschultz v. Charter Advanced Servs. (MN), LLC, 140 S. Ct. 6, 7 (2019)
(mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (finding it “doubtful [that] a federal
policy . . . of nonregulation . . . is ‘Law’ for purposes of the Supremacy Clause” and, hence,
preemptive of state regulation).
21. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 236 (describing the major questions doctrine as a Step
Zero doctrine). There is, to be sure, some controversy over the major questions doctrine’s true
place in Chevron’s framework. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific
Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2016). I can safely set aside such questions for
my present purposes. My analysis does not turn on the doctrine’s precise place in Chevron’s
larger framework.
22. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225–26, 231 (1994). Congress would
later grant the FCC such power in express terms. See Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1569 (2016) (“The FCC’s decades-long efforts to alter the Communications Act’s requirements in the face of newly emerging competition—culminating in
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Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v. Burwell that if “Congress wished
to assign” a “question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ ” “to an
agency, it surely would have done so expressly.” 23 Finding no such express
delegation of policymaking power, the Court declined there to apply Chevron’s framework. 24
Can the status of a question—as either major or not—turn on its answer?
Based on his views as a member of the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh seems to think so. Explaining how this is so requires
a brief detour into the regulatory history of network neutrality (or, colloquially, net neutrality).
1.

Network Neutrality

As I noted above, the Commission decided, in 2002, to treat cable modem–based internet access as beyond most of its regulatory powers. It accomplished this by reclassifying the service an “information service.” 25 The
Commission’s regulatory powers under the Telecommunications Act of
1996 depend, in part, on the type of service it seeks to regulate—
“information service” or “telecommunications service,” among other regulatory classifications. The differences between the telecommunications service
and the information-service designations are vast. 26 “Classified as a []telecommunications service,[] a communications offering may be subject to the
full panoply of the [Commission’s] regulatory power—rate regulation, service specification, and more.” 27 By contrast, information services are largely
beyond the Commission’s reach. 28
The Commission’s decision to choose the information-service designation was premised, however, on the mistaken impression that, such deregulation notwithstanding, it would nevertheless retain some ancillary powers to
require broadband carriers to comply with network neutrality rules—rules
that, among other things, prevent carriers from blocking or unreasonably
inhibiting consumers’ access to lawful internet content. 29 In short, network
the Commission’s defeat in MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T—is what initially prompted Congress to enact the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s forbearance provision.” (footnote omitted)).
23. 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
24. King, 576 U.S. at 486 (“This is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the correct reading [of the statute].”).
25. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (Declaratory Rule and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (50), (53).
27. Tejas N. Narechania, The Secret Life of a Text Message, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 197,
209 (2020).
28. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
29. See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Freedoms Policy Statement]
(Policy Statement).

December 2020]

Symmetry and (Network) Neutrality

51

neutrality rules require that broadband carriers—companies like AT&T,
Comcast, and Verizon—treat like internet traffic alike, without prioritizing
favored providers (including affiliated companies), blocking disfavored ones,
or otherwise demanding fees for delivering internet content to its destination. 30 Former Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael
Powell explained that such rules offered “an insurance policy against the potential rise of abusive market power by vertically integrated providers.” 31
Moreover, then-Chairman Powell explained that these rules would “empower American consumers” and give “[p]ower to the [p]eople” by ensuring that
they remained free from broadband carrier “interference.” 32 But the Commission was wrong about its power to enforce such network neutrality rules
under the information-service paradigm. 33
Hence, in 2015, the Commission decided to revisit its classification decision, concluding that broadband carriage was now better characterized as a
telecommunications service and that, given this new classification, the
Commission might finally promulgate enforceable network neutrality obligations in service of these competition and consumer-protection goals. 34 It
was correct: The Commission’s decision to reclassify the broadband carriage
also conferred the power to enforce network neutrality rules against the newly designated telecommunications services that it could not apply to information services. 35
2.

Network Neutrality and the Major Questions Doctrine

It may seem odd that the Commission can so easily change its mind
about the statutory classification of a service, thereby dramatically altering
the scope of its regulatory powers over that service. But this is precisely the
approach that the Supreme Court endorsed in its 2005 Brand X decision,
reasoning (consistent with Chevron itself) that agencies could best draw upon specialized technical and legal expertise and be held to account for their
policy choices by political leaders and the voting public. 36 As noted above,
30. See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
31. Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry,
3 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 12 (2004).
32. Id. at 6–7, 11.
33. E.g., Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d 642; Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
34. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5644, 5763–65
(2015) [hereinafter Open Internet Order] (Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling,
and Order).
35. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
36. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(explaining that agencies “must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy
on a continuing basis,” including “in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in
administrations” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863–64 (1984))); see id. at 1002–03 (explaining that “[t]he questions the Commission resolved
in the order under review involve a ‘subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic’ ”
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Brand X affirmed the Commission’s Cable Modem Order, which placed cable modem service largely beyond its regulatory ambit. 37
Before the Cable Modem Order, the Commission treated most broadband carriers—consistent with both agency and judicial precedent—as telecommunications service providers. 38 But broadband internet access offered
over cable television wires was new and thus did not obviously fall inside any
existing regulated service. 39 Hence, finding sufficient ambiguity in the statutory definitions of these competing services, the Court agreed in Brand X
that the Commission may reasonably conclude that broadband carriage was
an “information service” largely immune to Commission regulation. 40
As I noted above, the Commission sought to undo this decision one
decade later. The Commission’s reasoning rested heavily on intervening
changes in the market for broadband carriage 41—and also on Brand X. The
Supreme Court’s opinion there, after all, seemed to suggest that either classification—information service or telecommunications service—might be a
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 42 And in view of new
market conditions, the Commission concluded that the telecommunications
service classification was a better fit. 43
The broadband carriers’ challenge to the Commission’s Order setting
out this new classification and promulgating concomitant network neutrality
rules failed on Brand X’s terms. 44 In USTA v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X
practically compelled a decision in favor of the Commission: Brand X concluded that the statute was ambiguous; Brand X suggested that either classi-

and that “[t]he Commission is in a far better position to address these questions” than the
courts (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n Inc. v.
Gulf Power, Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002))).
37. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
38. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005) (Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking)
(explaining that DSL had been traditionally treated as a telecommunications service before this
reclassification order); see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1000 (noting the regulatory classification of
DSL).
39. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 347
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling on the Commission to
make a classification decision, and concluding that cable-based internet access might even fall
within the “cable service” classification). But see Tejas N. Narechania & Tim Wu, Sender Side
Transmission Rules for the Internet, 66 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 467, 488 (2014) (concluding that
the better interpretative view is one that treats broadband carriage as a telecommunications
service). I continue to believe that this is the better interpretative view, though I agree that the
statutory definitions of these classifications are ambiguous and merit deference under Chevron.
40. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 987–89.
41. Open Internet Order, supra note 34, at 5743–44.
42. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981.
43. Open Internet Order, supra note 34, at 5745.
44. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA I), 825 F.3d 674, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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fication was reasonable; and the Commission’s factual analysis of new market conditions adequately explained its revised conclusion. 45
But, on a petition for rehearing en banc, then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented, suggesting that Brand X did not supply the relevant standard. Instead,
Kavanaugh contended that the relevant question arose at Chevron’s Step Zero. Chevron, recall, does not apply to questions of deep “economic and political significance.” 46 And Kavanaugh contended that, though the 2002 Cable
Modem Order at issue in Brand X entailed mere “light-touch regulation”
that constituted only “an ordinary rule, not a major rule,” the Commission’s
2015 Open Internet Order was a “major rule” not expressly authorized by
Congress. 47 Hence, though Chevron’s framework applied in Brand X, he contended that it could not sustain the Commission’s actions under review in
USTA. In his view, the Commission’s network neutrality rules purported to
regulate a significant aspect of the domestic economy (namely, broadband
carriage), and agencies may issue such rules of economic significance only
when clearly authorized to do so. So, the Commission was not clearly authorized to issue these rules: “Brand X’s finding of ambiguity by definition
means that Congress has not clearly authorized the FCC to issue the net neutrality rule. And that means that the net neutrality rule is unlawful under the
major rules doctrine.” 48
In short, then-Judge Kavanaugh suggested that whether a question is
major turns on the agency’s response. The Commission was asked, repeatedly, to resolve the status of broadband internet access. 49 When it answered

45. Id.; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1001 n.4 (“Any inconsistency [over time] bears on
whether the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on
whether its interpretation is consistent with the statute.”).
46. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
47. Id. at 425–26 n.5. Importantly, Judge Kavanaugh’s characterization of the Commission’s 2002 Order is rather incomplete, overlooking the Commission’s (mistaken) belief that it
could continue to enforce network neutrality norms under the information-service classification it then promulgated. That is, even in 2002, the Commission understood its rule as entailing “common-carrier regulation” of the exact same “vast economic and political significance”
as the 2015 Order. Compare id. (suggesting that the Cable Modem Order was an example of
mere “light-touch regulation”), with Internet Freedoms Policy Statement, supra note 29 (explaining that the Commission intended to enforce network neutrality obligations on broadband carriers classified information-services providers). And the Court’s 2005 decision in
Brand X predates any other decision suggesting that the Commission could not enforce these
norms under the information-service paradigm. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Indeed, at the time Brand X was decided, the Commission had already enforced network neutrality norms against an internet access provider, settling, for $15,000, allegations that it had blocked access to a competing Voice
Over IP telephony service provider. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295
(2005) (Order).
48. USTA II, 855 F.3d at 426 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
49. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 347
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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“information service,” the Supreme Court said that Chevron’s usual rules applied. But when it answered “telecommunications service,” Kavanaugh suggested that the classification question was too significant for deference to
apply. Indeed, as noted, Kavanaugh expressly acknowledged this asymmetry,
stating plainly that the major questions limitation on Chevron applies only
when an agency offers a “regulatory” answer—but not, as was the case in
Brand X, a putatively deregulatory one.
One might wonder whether it was a major step for the FCC to impose even
light-touch “information services” regulation on Internet service providers.
The answer is no . . . . The FCC’s light-touch regulation did not entail
common-carrier regulation and was not some major new regulatory step of
vast economic and political significance. The rule at issue in Brand X therefore was an ordinary rule, not a major rule. As a result, the Chevron doctrine applied, not the major rules doctrine. 50

Stated in Walters’s terms, Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that the major
questions doctrine may help to address a possible Type I error (here, the
view that Congress did not mean for broadband carriage to fall within the
Commission’s authority over telecommunications services) but not a Type II
error (the view that Congress did mean for the service to continue to fall
within the Commission’s authority over telecommunications services). 51
II.

SYMMETRY AND NEUTRALITY

Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissental in USTA suggests an additional example of asymmetry in administrative law, alongside the many others Walters catalogues in Symmetry’s Mandate. And this example, too, is significant
for its normative implications, both as applied to network neutrality specifically and more generally. Communications scholars disagree over the import
and effect of the Commission’s network neutrality rules. Some—even some
network neutrality proponents—see the policy primarily as a wealthallocation device, shifting profits from broadband carriers (companies like
Comcast and Verizon) and assigning them, instead, to content providers
(companies like Facebook, Google, and Netflix). 52 Others (myself included)
see it as a competition-, democracy-, and speech-enhancing rule that, among
other things, mitigates concerns over potentially anticompetitive and antidemocratic behavior while preserving the internet’s opportunities to advance
both free speech and new innovation. But no matter how one views the network neutrality rule, then-Judge Kavanaugh’s asymmetric application of the
major questions doctrine to the Commission’s decision seems to make little
sense.

50. USTA II, 855 F.3d at 425 n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc). See supra note 47 (explaining that Judge Kavanaugh’s characterization is inaccurate,
even on its own terms).
51. See Deacon, supra note 7.
52. See infra notes 53–54.
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A. Network Neutrality as Wealth Transfer
I begin by adopting, arguendo, the view that network neutrality regulation is little more than a wealth-allocation device. Even some advocates of
network neutrality rules have suggested that broadband carriers (like Comcast and Verizon) and content providers (like Facebook and Netflix) are
“complements of each other in a hugely lucrative business, and the network
neutrality debates are nothing more than an argument about how to share
the proceeds.” 53 Critics have likewise characterized network neutrality as a
mere “battle over the allocation of economic rents.” 54 Under this view, advocates and critics agree that bandwidth is a resource that someone must pay
for. Comcast, for example, might bear the initial expenses of upgrading an
internet access network and then make that additional bandwidth available
to whoever needs it (say, Google) at no additional charge (over and above
the subscription fees paid by Comcast’s retail consumers). Alternately,
Google might find that its services are being delivered too slowly, and so it
might pay Comcast to upgrade its facilities, reserving the additional capacity
for itself (and thereby freeing the extant bandwidth for other applications,
like Netflix). Hence, when bandwidth is scarce, either its suppliers (broadband carriers) or its consumers (say, content providers) might pay for new
capacity. But network neutrality rules foreclose the latter route, on the theory, in part, that robust competition among content providers—competition
unimpeded by the barriers that the carriers’ termination fees would present,
or by practices favoring the carriers’ own affiliated services—will best grow
consumer demand for such content as well as for the bandwidth necessary to
deliver it. Supply will follow that demand.
Hence, network neutrality rules have the practical effect of assigning
such infrastructure costs to broadband carriers: Whenever, say, Comcast
chooses to upgrade its network facilities, it must do so out of its own coffers
and recoup those expenses (if at all) from its own retail customers.

53. Yotam Harchol, Dirk Bergemann, Nick Feamster, Eric Friedman, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Aurojit Panda, Sylvia Ratnasamy, Michael Schapira & Scott Shenker, A Public Option
for the Core, 2020 PROC. ANN. CONF. ACM SPECIAL INT. GRP. ON DATA COMMC’N ON
APPLICATIONS, TECHS., ARCHITECTURES, & PROTOCOLS FOR COMPUT. COMMC’N 377, 388.
54. See, e.g., Why Net Neutrality Matters: Protecting Consumers and Competition
Through Meaningful Open Internet Rules: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 5 (2014) (testimony of Jeffrey A. Eisenach, visiting scholar, Am. Enter. Inst.),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-17-14EisenachTestimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SL9H-RVMP]; see also Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet
Neutral? Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 575, 589–90 (2007)
(Christopher Yoo contending that “a large part of the network neutrality debate can be viewed
as nothing more than an intramural fight between the large content providers (like Google)
and the large network providers (like Verizon and Comcast),” that “network neutrality would
affect the way that the resulting profits would be divided between the Googles and the Verizons of the world,” and that “[a]lthough the division of profits between network providers is
crucial to those companies and their shareholders, it is not ultimately a policy issue”).
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Likewise, the Commission’s decision to rescind network neutrality rules
has the practical effect of assigning these infrastructure costs to content providers: Whenever, say, Netflix finds that it requires more capacity to deliver
video content to consumers, Comcast (for example) can demand that Netflix
pay for that capacity, and Netflix can recoup those expenses (if at all) from
its own subscribers.
In short, if network neutrality rules are best viewed as a wealthallocation policy, then any network neutrality policy choice is wealth allocative, no matter whether the rules exist or do not exist. It is as much a policy
choice to rescind the rules as it is to promulgate them. If the rules exist, then
content providers reap the rewards; but if the rules do not exist, then broadband carriers benefit.
Such an analysis, moreover, applies to a wide range of agency action.
Agencies, after all, do not issue rules punitively but in order (in many cases)
to assign costs to a cheap cost avoider (so that the rule’s benefits outweigh its
costs). 55 Consider, for example, a pollution control statute. An agency might
issue a regulation imposing significant costs on, say, coal-fired power plants.
Alternately, the agency might rescind (or decline to impose in the first instance) that same rule, thereby imposing the substantial costs of pollution on
the public. 56 No matter which path the agency chooses—nonregulation, regulation, or deregulation—the agency’s policy choice is of similar effect, imposing the costs of its decision on some affected population.
Against this backdrop, then-Judge Kavanaugh’s claim that the major
questions doctrine applies to imposition of network neutrality rules (but not
to their rescission) is odd. In either case, the Commission’s policy choice is a
regulatory step of similar significance. 57 Indeed, the scalar value of the economic consequence seems roughly the same, no matter whether its vector
points in the direction of broadband carriers or content providers. 58 If the
rule is major, then it should be major no matter whether it imposes these
rules or whether it rescinds them, no matter whether it imposes those costs
on carriers or on content providers. Such symmetry draws from Step Zero’s
basic premise: Step Zero (and the major questions doctrine) asks whether
Congress has delegated certain policy choices to the agency. Assuming such
a delegation—in this instance, assuming the power to choose between the
telecommunications and information-service designations—the Step Zero
inquiry is neutral as between the available choices. Once Congress has delegated power to the agency, it is up to the agency to give its best answer. In
short, the major questions doctrine is about major policy choices, not major

55. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
56. Cf. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871–72 (N.Y. 1970).
57. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA II), 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
58. See e.g., Scalar and Vector Quantities, BBC: BITESIZE, https://www.bbc.co.uk
/bitesize/guides/z2b9hv4/revision/6 [https://perma.cc/2XLS-KJHQ] (defining scalar and vector
quantities).
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policy outcomes. 59 Given a major policy question, any outcome is major.
And given an ordinary policy question, as in Brand X, any outcome is ordinary.
This, of course, was not then-Judge Kavanaugh’s view. He offered no rationale for a rule that operates, instead, at the level of the regulatory outcome, favoring, in this instance, one large industry (broadband carriers) over
another (content providers). In my view, there isn’t one. 60 Indeed, this
asymmetry seems, instead, to breach the ideal that such matters of “interpretation should be neutral, impartial, and predictable.” 61
B. Network Neutrality as a Coordination Device
The defects in then-Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the major questions
doctrine loom even larger when taking a broader view of network neutrality’s purpose. After all, former Chairman Powell did not explain the need for
network neutrality rules by way of a subsidy to content providers. Rather, as
noted, those rules were meant to insure “against the potential rise of abusive
market power by vertically integrated providers,” and moreover, to confer
“[p]ower to the [p]eople” by freeing consumers from carrier “interference.” 62
Hence, the wealth-allocation view of network neutrality is rather incomplete. Rather, like other competition policy principles, network neutrality
helps to prevent the aggrandization of power in vertically integrated communications providers by reallocating the coordination rights that are typically vested in such firms and by granting them to consumers, who may
select the content and applications of their choice without regard to that
content’s status as affiliated (or not) with the facilities owner. 63 In short,
network neutrality limits the extent to which Comcast (for example) can favor its own proprietary video service at the expense of both external competitors and, importantly, consumers who prefer those outside providers.
Without network neutrality rules, firms are free to favor affiliated entities at
the expense of both putative competitors and consumer preferences. AT&T
might, as a broadband carrier, grant various advantages to affiliated content

59. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994) (concluding that
the FCC could not make a major deregulatory move without express direction from Congress).
60. One alternative view—though not one endorsed by then-Judge Kavanaugh—is that
the Court was wrong to defer to the Commission’s interpretation in Brand X. Though it is well
outside the scope of this short Essay to undertake a complete defense of Chevron and Brand X,
it suffices for now to note that, for various reasons of institutional competence and accountability—the very rationales that undergird the Chevron doctrine—Brand X (rather than Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissental) supplies the better standard of review, no matter whether the agency
takes a regulatory or deregulatory step.
61. Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2143; see also id. at 2120–22.
62. Powell, supra note 31, at 7, 12.
63. See Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV.
378 (2020).
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providers (including, say, HBO). 64 This is so even where consumers would
prefer to watch Netflix instead of HBO (an AT&T affiliate) or Peacock
(Comcast’s service). In many regions, this is because broadband carriers’
service terms are not disciplined by competition: Many consumers only have
access to one wireline broadband carrier. 65 Moreover, even where competition exists, switching is not frictionless: It can be onerous to cancel service
from one carrier and provision service from another. And so, even where
competition exists, carriers may be able to impose incremental burdens on
consumers that do not exceed switching costs. 66 The Commission’s network
neutrality rules helped to curb this “gatekeeper” power. 67
In total, in this two-sided market (where broadband carriers serve both
content providers and retail consumers), the costs or benefits of a network
neutrality–related policy decision are borne, as explained above, by broadband carriers and content providers—and also retail consumers. 68 Stated
simply, any policy choice gives rise to important effects on all three of these
interested constituencies.
This is notable for several reasons.
For one, network neutrality rules reduce the burdens that consumers
might otherwise face to using their preferred internet-based services. Stated
similarly, without network neutrality rules, carriers might nudge consumers
to use services that they actually like less. If, for example, AT&T makes HBO
free but Netflix costly, consumers may watch HBO, even if they’d rather
watch Netflix’s content. And the lost value of the difference in preference
presents a regressive burden on consumers; it is a greater proportional harm
to the average retail consumer. Indeed, the absence of network neutrality
rules may be felt most acutely by historically marginalized populations. 69

64. See WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, POLICY REVIEW OF
MOBILE BROADBAND OPERATORS’ SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO-RATED CONTENT
AND SERVICES (2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0111
/DOC-342987A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRD7-KWNV].
65. See Tejas N. Narechania, Federal and State Authority for Broadband Regulation, 18
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 456, 477 (2015).
66. See id.; see also Lukasz Grzybowski, Maude Hasbi & Julienne Liang, Transition from
Copper to Fiber Broadband: The Role of Connection Speed and Switching Costs, INFO. ECON. &
POL’Y, Mar. 2018, at 1.
67. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646–47 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
68. Some have argued that the consumer effect is relatively small, since either Comcast
or Netflix will raise consumers’ prices to account for necessary bandwidth investments. While
that may be true, such a view assumes a competitive and relatively frictionless market. Broadband carriage is anything but. Hence, absent network neutrality protections, carriers can impose incremental costs on consumers, up to the costs of switching.
69. See Raymond M. Brescia, Dominance and Disintermediation: Subversive Stories and
Counter-Narratives of Cooperation, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429, 468 & n.238 (2018) (suggesting that network neutrality helps historically marginalized populations develop and distribute counter-narratives to a dominant frame, citing W. Kamau Bell, Opinion, Net
Neutrality: Why Artists and Activists Can’t Afford to Lose It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017)); see
also John McMurria, From Net Neutrality to Net Equality, 10 INT’L J. COMMC’N 5931, 5944–45
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Hence, network neutrality rules vest decisional power in consumers. As
described above, the carriers’ influence over internet traffic may allow them
to distort market outcomes. To stay with the same example, AT&T can give
HBO an advantage over Netflix, notwithstanding a true preference for Netflix—especially in regions where AT&T faces little to no competition, or
where switching from AT&T is costly or difficult. But network neutrality
rules return that decisional power to consumers, who otherwise have few
mechanisms to make their preferences known. In short, network neutrality
rules ensure that consumers have a voice in the market for internet-enabled
services, where exit from the broadband-carriage market is impractical. 70
Justice Kavanaugh’s suggestion, making it more difficult for the Commission
to select a network neutrality–friendly regulatory classification, thus both is
inconsistent with Step Zero’s focus on congressional intent to delegate decisional authority and also tends to “amplif[y]” the “well-known concerns regarding agency capture and the collective action problems that hinder
organization around interests shared by the public at large.” 71
Finally, network neutrality is a policy that has broad popular support
across the ideological spectrum. 72 But an asymmetric approach to the major
questions doctrine would exert legal pressure on agencies to choose an interpretation that “favors its regulated entities” (and to avoid a classification decision that “disfavor[s] its regulated entities”), notwithstanding

(2016) (suggesting that “stopping Internet providers from degrading functionality among disenfranchised populations” is one way to “challeng[e] [the] race-neutral thinking in law and
policy” that has dominated the network neutrality discourse); see generally id. at 5939 (noting
absence of minority-owned cable systems).
I do not, of course, mean to imply that the restoration of network neutrality rules would
suddenly solve the problems faced by historically marginalized populations. Several scholars
have explained how network neutrality is a second-order problem for the many communities
that still lack internet access. See, e.g., Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 443,
447 (2016); Rachel E. Moran & Matthew N. Bui, Race, Ethnicity and Telecommunications Policy Issues of Access and Representation: Centring Communities of Color and Their Concerns, 43
TELECOMMS. POL’Y 461, 471 (2019) (explaining that arguments “center[ing] around the role of
Internet as a cure to the issues of representation and access . . . rest[] on an unsubstantiated
and dangerous assumption that the first-level digital divide of broadband access no longer exists”). Rather, I mean only what I say: The problems that network neutrality rules help to solve
may be felt most acutely by these communities whenever such rules are absent.
70. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (explaining consumer economic
choices in terms of exiting the market or voicing preferences).
71. Daniel T. Deacon, Essay, Common Carrier Essentialism and the Emerging Common
Law of Internet Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 133, 182 (2015). For a theoretical discussion of
why courts should avoid promulgating approaches that, like the asymmetric approach proposed by Justice Kavanaugh, favor powerful entities over less powerful individuals, see generally Aaron Tang, Reverse Political Process Theory, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (2017).
72. Amir Nasr, The American People Broadly Support Net Neutrality, NEW AM. (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/american-people-broadly-support-net-neutrality/
[https://perma.cc/5PAF-F25G].
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countervailing political pressures. 73 Where Chevron explains its rule of mandatory deference by reference to political-accountability values—requiring
agencies to justify their policy choices to the political branches and the voting public—then-Judge Kavanaugh’s application of the major questions doctrine undermines such values by putting a thumb on the scale in favor of
deregulation—even where an agency’s politics and expertise point in another
direction.
CONCLUSION
As described above, Symmetry’s Mandate offers a compelling account of
an asymmetry in the practice of administrative law, one that appears to favor
deregulation over regulation. Justice Kavanaugh’s proposed approach to the
major questions doctrine—proposed during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit
and in response to the Obama Administration’s decision to promulgate enforceable network neutrality rules—fits that mold. But this approach, like the
others that Walters highlights, makes little sense. Justice Kavanaugh’s approach treats analogous wealth transfers—between industries, or between
industries and the public—dissimilarly, and it does so in favor of regulated
industries, putting outsiders and the public at a distinct disadvantage in the
regulatory process. In short, his approach conflicts with Step Zero’s foundational focus on congressional intent, pays little mind to capture and collective action–related concerns, and undermines agency expertise and
accountability values. The judiciary should thus reject Justice Kavanaugh’s
doctrinal suggestion in favor of a more, well, neutral application of the major
questions doctrine.

73. Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 649 (2015).

